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Bersani v. EPA: Wetlands Protection-The
EPA Veto Power Under the Clean Water
Act
I. Introduction
The Congressional objective of the Clean Water Act
(CWA)1 is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."' 2 Sections
301(a)3 and 404" of the CWA regulate the discharge of
dredged or fill material into navigable waters3 which include
wetlands.' No discharge is permitted if there is a practicable
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
2. CWA § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
3. CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). This section provides: "Except as in com-
pliance with this section and section[] ... 404 [§ 1344] of this title, the discharge of
any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful." Id.
4. CWA § 404(a)-(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a)-(c). These subsections state in relevant
part:
(a) The Secretary may issue permits ... for the discharge of dredged or fill
material into the navigable waters at specified disposal sites .... (b) Sub-
ject to subsection (c) of this section, each such disposal site shall be specified
for each such permit by the Secretary [of the Army] (1) through the applica-
tion of guidelines developed by the Administrator, in conjunction with the
Secretary .... (c) The Administrator is authorized to prohibit the specifica-
tion (including the withdrawal of specification) of any defined area as a dis-
posal site, and he is authorized to deny or restrict the use of any defined area
for specification (including the withdrawal of specification) as a disposal site,
whenever he determines . . .that the discharge of such materials into such
area will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies,
shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding areas),
wildlife, or recreational areas.
Id.
5. CWA § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). This section states: "The term 'navigable
waters' means the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." The
meaning of the phrase "waters of the United States" has been judicially determined
to include wetlands. Id. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S.
121 (1985).
6. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1990). This section states in relevant part:
The term "wetlands" means those-areas that are inundated or saturated
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alternative.7 The relevant time at which to determine if a
practicable alternative is available to a developer's wetlands
site was at issue in Bersani v. EPA.' In Bersani, the develop-
ers of a shopping mall,9 Pyramid, brought an action challeng-
ing the final determination by the EPA10 which vetoed the
Army Corps of Engineers' (Corps) decision to issue a CWA
section 404 permit to fill the Sweedens Swamp site in Att-
leboro, Massachusetts." The district court granted summary
judgment for EPA.1 2 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit was asked to invalidate the EPA's inter-
by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support,
and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation
typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally in-
clude swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas.
Id.
7. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)-(a)(2) (1990). This section states in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided under section 404(b)(2), no discharge of dredged
or fill material shall be permitted if there is a practicable alternative to the
proposed discharge which would have less adverse impact on the aquatic
ecosystem, so long as the alternative does not have other significant adverse
environmental consequences. (1) For the purpose of this requirement, practi-
cable alternatives include, but are not limited to: (i) Activities which do not
involve a discharge of dredged or fill material into the waters of the United
States or ocean waters; (ii) Discharges of dredged or fill material at other
locations in waters of the United States or ocean waters; (2) An alternative is
practicable if it is available and capable of being done after taking into con-
sideration cost, existing technology, and logistics in light of overall project
purposes. If it is otherwise a practicable alternative, an area not presently
owned by the applicant which could reasonably be obtained, utilized, ex-
panded or managed in order to fulfill the basic purpose of the proposed activ-
ity may be considered.
Id. [hereinafter the practicable alternatives test].
8. 850 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1089 (1989). In the Second
Circuit, this case was incorrectly entitled as Bersani v. Robichaud. Robichaud was an
intervenor on Bersani's behalf.
9. Specifically, the developers include John Bersani, the Pyramid Companies,
Newport Galleria Group, and Robert J. Gongel (Pyramid, collectively).
10. EPA, Final Determination of the EPA's Assistant Administrator for External
Affairs Concerning the Sweedens Swamp Site in Attleboro, Mass. Pursuant to Section
404(c) of the Clean Water Act (1986), summarized in 51 Fed. Reg. 22,977 (1986)
[hereinafter Final Determination Sweedens Swamp].
11. Bersani v. EPA, 674 F. Supp. 405 (N.D.N.Y. 1987), af/'d, 850 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1089 (1989).
12. Id. at 420-21.
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pretation of the guidelines"3 promulgated pursuant to CWA
section 404(b)(1). 14 The court was also asked to invalidate the
EPA's interpretation of the procedures promulgated pursuant
to CWA section 404(c).15 The EPA's interpretation allowed it
to apply the practicable alternatives test 6 to sites available at
the time of market entry, 7 rather than just to sites available
at the time of permit application. 8 The United States court of
appeals upheld the EPA's market entry approach. 19 This case
is significant for two reasons: 1) the timing of the application
of the practicable alternatives test is an issue of first impres-
sion in the courts;20 and 2) the upholding of the EPA's CWA
section 404(c) veto promotes the preservation of wetlands.
This note will describe and analyze the conflicting argu-
ments put forth on appeal in Bersani concerning the EPA's
market entry approach. Section II will present the legal back-
ground regarding Bersani. The history of the Sweedens
Swamp site, the district court and the court of appeals opin-
ions will be reviewed in Section III. Section IV will analyze
the courts' decisions and Section V will conclude that the
court of appeals' affirmance is legally correct and environmen-
tally sound.
13. Section 404(b)(1) [§ 1344(b)(1)]. Guidelines for the Specification of Disposal
Sites for Dredged or Fill Material are codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.1-.80 (1990). These
guidelines were developed by the EPA in conjunction with the Corps. CWA §
404(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1).
14. CWA § 404(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1).
15. CWA § 404(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c). Section 404(c) procedures are codified at
40 C.F.R. §§ 231.1-.8 (1989). These procedures are "to be followed by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency in prohibiting or withdrawing the specification, or denying,
restricting, or withdrawing the use for specification, of any defined area as a disposal
site for dredged or fill material pursuant to section 404(c) of the Clean Water Act
." 40 C.F.R. § 231.1 (1990).
16. See supra note 7.
17. See Bersani v. EPA, 850 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1089 (1989). Time of market entry refers to the point in time which a developer en-
ters the real estate market in search of a site for his project. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. The market entry approach refers to "the interpretation by EPA of the
relevant regulation which led EPA to consider the availability of alternative sites at
the time [the developer] entered the market for a site, instead of at the time it ap-
plied for a permit." Id. at 38.
20. Id. at 45.
1990]
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II. Legal Background
A. Statutes and Regulations
The Bersani case concerns the statutory relationship be-
tween the EPA and the Corps regarding the issuance of CWA
section 404 permits, the promulgation of interpretive regula-
tions, and the section 404(c) veto. The EPA exercises para-
mount authority to administer the CWA.2 1 The United States
Attorney General issued an opinion stating that when the
EPA and the Corps conflict on jurisdictional policy matters,
the EPA's interpretations are controlling.2 The Conference
Committee report on the CWA clearly indicates that the EPA
is to have veto power over the issuance of permits under sec-
tion 404(c).23 The Corps' special policies and procedures rec-
ognize the EPA veto, but the Corps will continue administra-
tive processing of applications even if a section 404(c)
procedure is initiated.2 The EPA draws a distinction between
its right to use the veto after issuance of the permit and its
choice to do so. 2 5
Congress specifically intended CWA section 404 to pro-
tect wetlands. As Senator Muskie, a primary sponsor of the
CWA, stated:
There is no question that the systematic destruction of
the Nation's wetlands is causing serious, permanent eco-
logical damage. The wetlands and bays, estuaries and del-
tas are the Nation's most biologically active areas. They
represent a principal source of food supply. They are the
spawning grounds for much of the fish and shellfish which
populate the oceans, and they are passages for numerous
upland game fish. They also provide nesting areas for a
myriad of species of birds and wildlife. The unregulated
destruction of these areas is a matter which needs to be
21. CWA § 101(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d).
22. 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 15 (1979).
23. S. Rep. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 142, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. Nsws 3668, 3820.
24. 33 C.F.R. § 323.6 (1990).
25. EPA Denial or Restriction of Disposal Sites; Section 404(c) Procedures, 44
Fed. Reg. 58,076, 58,077 (1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 231.3 (1990)).
[Vol. 7
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corrected and which implementation of section 404 has
attempted to achieve.2 6
This congressional intent is carried forward in the EPA-
promulgated guidelines which govern the issuance of CWA
section 404 permits.27 The section 404(b)(1) guidelines state as
their fundamental precept that:
[D]redged or fill material should not be discharged into
the aquatic ecosystem, unless it can be demonstrated that
such a discharge will not have an unacceptable adverse
impact either individually or in combination with known
and/or probable impacts of other activities affecting the
ecosystems of concern.2
Additionally, section 404(b)(1) guidelines adopt as a national
policy the position that:
[T]he degradation or destruction of special aquatic sites,
such as filling operations in wetlands, is considered to be
among the most severe environmental impacts covered by
these Guidelines. The guiding principle should be that
degradation or destruction of special sites may represent
an irreversible loss of valuable aquatic resources. 9
Thus, section 404(b)(1) guidelines impose restrictions on dis-
charges of dredged or fill material.30 The guidelines create the
rebuttable presumption that there are practicable"1 alterna-
tives to non-water dependent discharges8 2 proposed for special
26. 123 CONG. REC. S26,697 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977) (statement of Sen. Muskie).
27. See supra note 13.
28. 40 C.F.R. § 230.1(c) (1990).
29. Id. § 230.1(d).
30. Id. § 230.10.
31. The EPA has ruled that: "What is practicable depends on cost, technical,
and logistic factors." EPA Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged
or Fill Material, 45 Fed. Reg. 85,336, 85,339 (1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 230.10
(1990)) (emphasis added). To be practicable an alternative must: 1) be capable of
achieving the basic purpose of the proposed activity and 2) be reasonably available or
obtainable. Reasonable availability is not necessarily determined by fact of ownership
or lack of ownership. Id.
32. "Non-water dependent" discharges are.defined as:
1990]
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aquatic sites.3 s This presumption forces "a hard look at the
feasibility of using environmentally preferable sites. 34 An-
other explicit, but rebuttable, presumption imposed is that
"alternatives to discharges in special aquatic sites are less
damaging to the aquatic ecosystem and are environmentally
preferable."3 " The general burden of proof under these guide-
lines requires an applicant, who proposes to discharge in a
special aquatic site, to persuade the permitting authority that
both presumptions have been clearly rebutted."
B. Prior Cases
Although this is the first challenge to the EPA's section
404(c) veto, the Corps' decisions to grant section 404 permits
have generated some case law regarding section 404(b)(1)
discharges. . . associated with activities which do not require access or prox-
imity to or siting within the special aquatic site to fulfill their basic purpose.
An example is a fill to create a restaurant site, since restaurants do not need
to be in wetlands to fulfill their basic purpose of feeding people.
Id.
33. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3) (1990). This section states in relevant part:
Where the activity associated with a discharge which is proposed for a special
aquatic site . . . does not require access or proximity to or siting within the
special aquatic site . . . to fulfill its basic purpose . . . practicable alterna-
tives that do not involve special aquatic sites are presumed to be available,
unless clearly demonstrated otherwise. In addition . . . all practicable alter-
natives to the proposed discharge which do not involve a discharge into a
special aquatic site are presumed to have less adverse impact on the aquatic
ecosystem, unless clearly demostrated [sic] otherwise.
Id.
Special aquatic sites are:
[T]hose sites identified in Subpart E. They are geographic areas, large or
small, possessing special ecological characteristics of productivity, habitat,
wildlife protection, or other important and easily disrupted ecological values.
These areas are generally recognized as significantly influencing or positively
contributing to the general overall environmental health or vitality of the en-
tire ecosystem of a region.
40 C.F.R. § 230.3(q-1) (1990).
Subpart E lists the following categories of special aquatic sites: sanctuaries and ref-
uges, wetlands, mud flats, vegetated shallows, coral reefs, and riffle and pool com-
plexes. 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.40-.45 (1990).
34. EPA Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill Mate-
rial, 45 Fed. Reg. 85,339 (1980).
35. Id.
36. Id.
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guidelines. In the following cases, the courts have addressed
various aspects of the section 404(b)(1) guidelines, as applied
by the Corps without reaching the issue of the timing of the
practicable alternatives test.
In National Audubon Society v. Hartz Mountain Devel-
opment Corp.,8 the court addressed the collateral issue of
whether a practicable alternative, that would serve the same
basic purpose of the project, must be one actually available to
the applicant as opposed to one available to someone else.38
The plaintiffs in National Audubon sought a preliminary in-
junction against the placing of fill for the building of stores,
offices, and warehouses in the Hackensack Meadows Wetlands
complex in New Jersey.3 9 The complaint alleged that the per-
mit was invalid because it was issued in violation of CWA sec-
tion 404 and corresponding regulations.40 The plaintiffs con-
tended that Hartz had not overcome the presumption of
available practicable alternatives. 41 Three practicable alterna-
tives were identified by the Corps: 1) abandonment, 2) mini-
mization of activity and 3) acquisition of another location.42
Surveys of light industrial and retail space, included in the
record, indicated that other possible sites lacked access to
transportation, were also wetlands, were being developed,
were not properly zoned or could not be acquired. 4 The court
held that the Corps correctly concluded that Hartz had clearly
demonstrated that there were no practicable alternatives. 44
37. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,724 (D.N.J. 1983).
38. Id. at 20,730-31.
39. Id. at 20,725, 20,731.
40. Id. at 20,730-31. The complaint also alleged that the Corps was in violation
of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (1988)
because: 1) it did not include the residential phase of the project in its consideration,
2) its evaluation of Hartz's mitigation plan was arbitrary and capricious, and 3) its
finding that no environmental impact statement was needed was unreasonable. Na-
tional Audubon, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,728-30.
41. National Audubon, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,728-30. See
supra note 31.
42. National Audubon, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,731. The aban-
donment alternative was not considered feasible because it did not serve the basic
purpose of "profitably building a commercial-industrial complex." Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
1990]
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Two years later, in Friends of the Earth v. Hintz,'5 envi-
ronmental groups appealed the district court's summary judg-
ment which upheld the Corps' issuance of a CWA section 404
permit to the owner of a logging company.46 The owner had
filled in a seventeen-acre tract of wetlands with wood waste to
create an export log storage and sorting facility.' 7 Friends of
the Earth claimed that the activity in question was not water
dependent and therefore, practicable alternatives to the per-
mit site existed.' 8 The court of appeals affirmed the district
court's decision.' 9 On the water dependency issue the court
stated, "The facility is an integrated complex so that the log
storage area is used both for domestic and export purposes.
Accordingly, the storage area must be adjacent to the ship-
loading facility, and therefore is a water dependent activity."5
On the question of alternative sites, the court held that "the
Corps made the proper analysis and weighed the correct fac-
tors in making its determination that no feasible alternatives
existed."51 When conducting .the CWA section 404(b)(1) eval-
uation, the Corps considered the logger's logistical needs and
the prohibitive expense of alternative sites.52
In Hough v. Marsh,5 3 the court reversed the Corps' per-
mit decision because the presumption of available alternatives
to wetland sites had not been adequately rebutted.5 ' Plain-
tiffs, the residents of Edgartown on Martha's Vineyard, al-
leged abuse of discretion by the Corps in the issuance of a
section 404 permit to the defendants.5 5 Defendants, Carroll
and Jones, planned to build private residences and a tennis
45. 800 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1986).
46. Id. at 829.
47. Id. at 825. The leachate from wood waste contains highly toxic materials. Id.
48. Id. at 831. Appellants were foreclosed from raising a water quality issue on
appeal. Id. at 834. See supra note 32 for definition of non-water dependent activity.
49. Friends of the Earth 800 F.2d at 831.
50. Id. at 833.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 557 F. Supp. 74 (D. Mass. 1982).
54. Id. at 77.
55. Id.
[Vol. 7
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court on a three-acre tract of land." This necessitated filling
in approximately one-quarter acre of wetlands.5 7 The court
granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs and remanded
for further corps consideration." The court held:
[T]he fact that the project is not water-dependent should
necessitate a more persuasive showing than otherwise
concerning the lack of alternatives. Indeed, the EPA
guidelines specifically require . . . that an applicant
"clearly demonstrate" that practicable alternatives to the
proposed fill of wetlands do not exist .... The private
defendants' entire effort to satisfy this burden consisted
... of the production of a certified letter from a single
realtor written more than fourteen months prior to the
Engineer's decision. There was no showing that this letter
. . . remained an accurate depiction of the local real es-
tate market during these fourteen months."
The court also noted that the defendants offered no explana-
tion for limiting their inquiry into practicable alternatives to a
single "prime residential" area.60
C. Final Determinations of the EPA
To date, the EPA has vetoed only ten Corps decisions to
grant permitsel and only the Final Determination Sweedens
56. Id. at 76.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 88. On remand, the Corps had to: 1) consider the applicability of Ed-
gartown's zoning by-law prohibiting the filling of any tidal marsh, id. at 85-86, 2)
consider the adverse economic impact of the destruction of the Edgartown lighthouse
located on the proposed site, id. at 86, and 3) officially determine if the lighthouse
was eligible to be placed on the National Register of Historic Places, id. at 87-88.
59. Id. at 83-84.
60. Id. at 84.
61. The following is a chronological listing of EPA determinations which exercise
the section 404(c) veto: EPA, Final Determination of the EPA's Administrator Con-
cerning the North Miami Landfill Site Pursuant to Section 404(c) of the Clean Water
Act (1981), summarized in 46 Fed. Reg. 10,203 (1981) [hereinafter Final Determina-
tion North Miami]; EPA, Final Determination of the EPA's Administrator Concern-
ing the M.A. Norden Site Pursuant to Section 404(c) of the Clean Water Act (1984),
summarized in 49 Fed. Reg. 29,142 (1984) [hereinafter Final Determination Norden];
EPA, Final Determination of the EPA's Assistant Administrator for External Affairs
1990]
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Swamp has generated case law. Particularly notable are the
Final Determination Norden and the Final Determination
Maybank. At trial these determinations were cited as in-
stances where the EPA did not apply its market entry ap-
proach.2 A synopsis of each determination in chronological
order follows.
The EPA's first exercise of its section 404(c) veto is found
in the Final Determination North Miami. e" The City of North
Miami proposed to create a recreational area. The original
plan called for the filling of 291 acres, of which 103 were wet-
lands, the creation of three shallow ponds with tidal connec-
tions, and the preservation of 8.2 acres of mangrove swamp."'
After receiving its permit, the City of North Miami applied
Concerning the Jack Maybank Site on Jehossee Island, S.C. Pursuant to Section
404(c) of the Clean Water Act (1985), summarized in 50 Fed. Reg. 20,291 (1985)
[hereinafter Final Determination Maybank]; EPA, Final Determination of the EPA's
Assistant Administrator for External Affairs Concerning the Bayou Aux Carpes Site
in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana Pursuant to Section 404(c) of the Clean Water Act
(1985), summarized in 50 Fed. Reg. 47,267 (1985) [hereinafter Final Determination
Bayou Aux Carpes]; Final Determination Sweedens Swamp, supra note 10; EPA, Fi-
nal Determination of the EPA's Assistant Administrator for Water Concerning Wet-
lands Owned by the Russo Development Corporation in Carlstadt, N.J. (1988), sum-
marized in 53 Fed. Reg. 16,469 (1988) [hereinafter Final Determination Russo]; EPA,
Final Determination of the EPA's Assistant Administrator for Water Concerning
Three Wetland Properties (Sites Owned by Henry Rem Estate, Marion Becker, et al.
and Senior Corporation) For Which Rockplowing is Proposed in East Everglades,
Dade County, Fla. (1988), summarized in 53 Fed. Reg. 30,093 (1988) [hereinafter Fi-
nal Determination East Everglades]; EPA, Final Determination of the EPA's Assis-
tant Administrator for Water Pursuant to Section 404(c) of the Clean Water Act
Concerning the Proposed Lake Alma Impoundment and Proposed Mitigation of As-
sociated Environmental Impacts in Alma, Bacon County, Ga. (1989), summarized in
54 Fed. Reg. 6,719 (1989) [hereinafter Final Determination Lake Alma]; EPA, Final
Determination of the EPA's Assistant Administrator for Water Pursuant to Section
404(c) of the Clean Water Act Concerning the Proposed Ware Creek Water Supply
Impoundment, James City County, Va. (1989), summarized in 54 Fed. Reg. 33,608
(1989) [hereinafter Final Determination Ware Creek]; EPA, Final Determination of
the EPA's Assistant Administrator for Water Pursuant to Section 404(c) of the Clean
Water Act Concerning the Proposed Big River Water Supply Impoundment in Kent
County, R.I. (1990), summarized in 55 Fed. Reg. 10,666 (1990) [hereinafter Final De-
termination Big River].
62. Bersani v. EPA, 850 F.2d 36, 44 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1089
(1989).
63. Final Determination North Miami, supra note 61.
64. Id. at 2-3.
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for a modification which proposed to excavate the tidal ponds
to thirty-five feet below mean sea level, to convert the man-
grove preserve to a borrow area, and to operate the site as a
sanitary landfill using garbage as fill material.as This site is
adjacent to North Biscayne Bay which, along with the adjoin-
ing mangrove swamps, supports recreational and commercial
fishing, serves as nursery grounds for marine fish and in-
vertebrates, and provides a major feeding area for birds and
wildlife, including two endangered species."' Based on evi-
dence that leachate generated by garbage already in place, ad-
jacent to the site, was contaminating shallow groundwater
with ammonia, and data from EPA models used to predict
production of leachate from garbage, the Administrator con-
cluded that: "[T]he use of the North Miami landfill site for
the placement of garbage will have unacceptable adverse ef-
fects on shellfish and fisheries areas, wildlife, and recreational
areas.""8 The Administrator further determined that "imposi-
tion of restrictions would be more appropriate than a total
prohibition against discharges.""
Three years later, in the Final Determination Norden,70
the EPA did not reach the issue of timing of the practicable
alternatives test because there were seven concurrently availa-
ble sites which met Norden's criteria. 71 The M.A. Norden
Company proposed to fill twenty-five acres of freshwater wet-
lands in Mobile, Alabama to build a recycling facility.72 This
tidally-influenced area is part of a larger freshwater forested
65. Id. A borrow area is an area from which fill is obtained. See id. at 19.
66. Id. at 10. The endangered species are the Eastern Brown pelican and the
West Indian manatee. Id.
67. Ammonia is acutely toxic to various aquatic species, and its chemical break-
down may result in eutrophication. Id. at 8-9.
68. Id. at 11.
69. Id. at 12. Some restrictions were imposed: a ban on garbage as fill, prohibi-
tion on converting the 8.2-acre mangrove preserve into a borrow area, and a prohibi-
tion on filling with any material the unfilled waters of the United States within the
site. Id.
70. Final Determination Norden, supra note 61.
71. Id. at 11-12. A special task force was commissioned to address the issue of
alternative sites. Id. at 10.
72. Id. at 1.
1990]
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wetland complex. 73 Plant biomass produced at this site was
significant to the shellfish and fishery resources of Mobile
River and Bay.7' Thus, the Administrator concluded that:
"[L]ess environmentally damaging alternatives are practicable
taking into consideration costs, technology and logistics ....
[TIhe adverse impacts on shellfish beds and fishery areas and
wildlife areas, if the site in question were to be filled, are un-
acceptable. '7 5 Therefore, the Administrator prohibited the
specification of the twenty-five acres as a disposal site.76
The following year, the EPA decided the Final Determi-
nation Maybank,77 but specifically did not address the issue of
available alternatives.7 Mr. Maybank proposed to construct
earthen dikes to impound tidal wetlands for duck hunting and
aquaculture.79 The dikes were to be built on top of remnant
rice field embankments80 If the new dikes were constructed to
a height of 3.3 to 4.5 feet above the mean high-water mark,
twenty-two to thirty-two acres of wetlands would have been
destroyed."1 Furthermore, studies indicated that impound-
ments "adversely impact the aquatic environment by reducing
the availability of marsh-derived organic carbon to the estu-
ary and by limiting access by numerous species of fish and
shellfish to required breeding, feeding and nursery habitat." 2
Based on the direct destruction and the results of the im-
poundment studies, the Assistant Administrator for External
Affairs determined that the replacement of "open, free flush-
ing" tidal marsh with impoundments resulted in unacceptable
73. Id. at 4.
74. Id. at 9.
75. Id. at 16.
76. Id. at 17.
77. Final Determination Maybank, supra note 61.
78. See id. Because the record did not provide "a conclusive demonstration re-
garding the practicability" of alternatives, the Assistant Administrator for External
Affairs did not consider a proposed upland site as a "substantive criterion" in making
his decision. Id. at 12.
79. Id. at 1, 2. The aquaculture involved shrimp farming. Id.
80. The unmaintained embankments were covered primarily by wetland vegeta-
tion and no longer barred tidal flooding of interior wetlands. Id. at 2.
81. Id. at 3.
82. Id. at 15.
[Vol. 7
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adverse effects and restricted the use of the Maybank site.8
No dredged or fill material could be deposited if it had the
purpose or effect of impounding the marsh.8 4
Later in the year, the EPA issued the Final Determina-
tion Bayou Aux Carpes.8 5 The site involved a partially com-
pleted Corps flood control project" and contained approxi-
mately 3,000 acres of wetlands, including bottomland
hardwoods, wooded swamps, scrub-shrub wetlands, fresh mar-
shes, ponds and open waterways.8 7 The Assistant Administra-
tor for External Affairs restricted use of the site for any dis-
charges of dredged or fill material88 based on a finding of
unacceptable adverse impacts.8 9 These adverse impacts in-
cluded: the elimination of the export detritus, the loss of wild-
life habitat, the loss of pollution filtering values, the loss of
recreational opportunities, and the resulting damage to hydro-
logically-connected wetlands.90
Two years after the Final Determination Sweedens
Swamp, the EPA issued the Final Determination Russo.9 1
This determination addressed an "after-the-fact" permit for
52.5 filled acres9" and a permit to fill an additional five acres
in the Hackensack River basin9s which had been granted by
the Corps to the Russo Development Corporation (Russo). 4
Russo proposed completing a warehouse complex by main-
taining the 52.5 acres, which were already filled, and by filling
an additional five acres.98 The Corps required a mitigation
plan consisting of enhancement of an unspecified wetland
83. Id. at 20.
84. Id.
85. Final Determination Bayou Aux Corpes, supra note 61.
86. Id. at 1.
87. Id. at 9.
88. Id. at 22. The flood control project completion was allowed conditioned on
the use of floodgates which would retain current hydrology except during storms. Id.
89. Id. at 15-16.
90. Id.
91. Final Determination Russo, supra note 61.
92. Id. at 2. These 52.5 acres were filled without authorization. Id.
93. The Hackensack River basin is located in New Jersey. Its associated wet-
lands are known as the Hackensack Meadowlands. Id. at 3.
94. Id. at 1.
95. Id.
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within 1.5 miles of the site and the preservation of twenty-
three acres of wetlands in an adjacent watershed.96
A wetland evaluation conducted by the EPA revealed
that the site was a rare local habitat.9 7 The Assistant Admin-
istrator for Water concluded that the "proposed mitigation
neither compensat[ed] for the loss of 57.5 acres of valuable
wildlife habitat nor constitut[ed] appropriate and practicable
mitigation"9 8 and would result in "a net resource loss."99
Based on a finding of unacceptable adverse effects on wildlife,
the Assistant Administrator for Water prohibited any dis-
charge on the site.100
In the same year, the EPA issued the Final Determina-
tion East Everglades. 101 This determination concerned three
separately owned properties, collectively consisting of 432
acres of prairie wetlands, 102 for which rockplowing was pro-
posed.10 The acting Assistant Administrator for Water pro-
hibited the specification of the three sites as discharge sites
for rockplowing. 10 This decision was based on a finding of un-
acceptable adverse effects to wildlife'0 5 due to loss of impor-
tant habitat.0 6 The acting Assistant Administrator for Water
96. Id. at 17. The adjacent watershed was in the Passaic River basin. Id. at 1.
97. Id. at 15. Four percent of the Hackensack Meadowlands is noncommon reed
dominated. The unauthorized fill of the 52.5 acres destroyed about eight percent of
this rare local habitat. Id.
98. Id. at 19.
99. Id. at 18. The Assistant Administrator for Water was mindful of the fact that
the section 404(c) veto would not prevent or reverse most of the unacceptable adverse
effects at this site. He stated that further actions would be necessary to "determine
the extent of wetland value replacement and [to] pursue compensatory action." Id. at
20.
100. Id. at 20.
101. Final Determination East Everglades, supra note 61.
102. Id. at 19. Prairie wetlands are seasonally-inundated, irregular rocky limes-
tone substrates, dominated by a vegetation of muhly grass and yellowtop, and inter-
spersed with solution holes containing blue green algae. Id. at 11.
103. Id. at 1. Rockplowing is a process that uses a multitoothed plow-like imple-
ment to break up and crush the limestone substrate of wetlands to prepare the land
for farming. Id. at 3.
104. Id. at 24.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 22. The loss of habitat would result in further declines in some species
populations in the area. Id.
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also noted that rockplowing was "contrary to ongoing efforts
to improve and restore the Everglades' ecological functions
which include support of a rich and diverse wildlife
population." 0 "
Later the same year, the EPA issued the Final Determi-
nation Lake Alma.108 This determination concerned the pro-
posed impoundment of uplands and wetlands to create Lake
Alma and the proposed mitigation of the associated environ-
mental impacts. e09 The primary purpose of this impoundment
was to provide "water-oriented outdoor recreational opportu-
nities" for residents of Alma, Georgia." 0 The proposal in-
cluded the damming of Hurricane Creek"' and the subse-
quent flooding of a portion of the flood plain. This proposal
would create a lake with a surface area of 1,400 acres" 2 and
fourteen discrete mitigation impoundments on Hurricane
Creek and its tributaries." 3 As proposed, the construction of
Lake Alma would impact on 1,155 acres of wetlands" 4 and the
mitigation measures would result in a net physical loss of
twelve acres of vegetated wetlands." 6 Based on site specific
cumulative impacts,"' the acting Assistant Administrator for
Water concluded that the project would result in unaccept-
107. Id. at 23.
108. Final Determination Lake Alma, supra note 61.
109. Id. at 5.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 39. Hurricane Creek and its associated flood plain are characterized as
a bottomland-hardwood wetland system. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 6. These mitigation impoundments would be managed primarily for
waterfowl production. Id.
114. Id. at 13. Approximately 957 acres of bottomland-hardwood wetlands would
be destroyed and approximately 200 acres would have their habitat functional values
reduced. Id. at 34.
115. Id. The mitigation would destroy thirty-five acres of wetland habitat to cre-
ate twenty-three acres of wetlands of "unknown quality." Id.
116. Some of the impacts considered were: 1) an adverse effect on a significant
percentage of wildlife species using the site; 2) impacts associated with the loss of a
substantial portion of bottomland-hardwood wetlands in the Hurricane Creek flood
plain; 3) impacts of the elimination of an integral link in the forested wetland corri-
dor; and 4) the exacerbation of the significant loss of wildlife habitat associated with
bottomland-hardwood wetlands which has already occurred in the southeastern
United States. Id. at 42-43.
1990]
15
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
able adverse effects on wildlife117 and, therefore, restricted the
site.ll
The next year, the EPA issued the Final Determination
Ware Creek." 9 This determination concerned the proposed
creation of a local water supply impoundment12 0 on Ware
Creek in James City County Virginia.' 2 ' The County proposed
to construct an earthen dam 22 in the Ware Creek basin to
create a 1,217-acre water supply reservoir.12' The impound-
ment would have resulted in the inundation of 381 acres of
vegetated wetlands.124 Forty-four acres of open water, pres-
ently less than two meters deep, would have been increased to
a depth of sixteen feet.' 2 5 The Ware Creek system 2 ' dis-
charges into the Lower York River Basin at approximately
twenty-three miles from where the York River empties into
the Chesapeake Bay. 27 The. hydrology of Ware Creek regu-
117. Id. at 43.
118. Id. The EPA prohibited the placement of fill for any activity associated
with the creation of "any reservoir, lake or impoundment on described waters, includ-
ing wetlands.. . ..." Id.
119. Final Determination Ware Creek, supra note 61.
120. Id. at 4. Although the administrative record contained references to the
need for a regional water supply for the Lower James River/York River Peninsula,
the EPA based its determination on the fact that the proposed project did not ad-
dress the region-wide, inter-jurisdictional water supply problems of the Lower Penin-
sula. Id. at 8.
121. Id. at 4.
122. Id. at 6. The dam as proposed would be 1,450 feet long, forty feet wide at
the crest, and 300 feet wide at the base, with a crest elevation of forty-eight feet
above mean sea level. Id.
123. Id. The reservoir would have an average depth of sixteen feet, a capacity of
6,355 million gallons, and provide a safe yield of 9.4 million gallons per day. Id. Safe
yield is a supply sufficient to provide water, without depleting the source, during the
drought of record. Id. n.3.
124. Id. at 1. The vegetated wetlands include scrub shrub, herbaceous and for-
ested wetland vegetation. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 14. Ware Creek and its associated tributaries, France Swamp, Cow
Swamp, and Bird Swamp drain into a generally undisturbed watershed which lies
within the coastal plain of the Tidewater region in southeastern Virginia. Id. The
upland areas of the watershed are dominated by hardwood and mixed pine-hardwood
forest. Id. at 15.
127. Id. at 14. Because of the estuarine tidal influx of the York River, the Ware
Creek system experiences large scale fluctuations in salinity and a back flow of brack-
ish waters well into the major creek channels. Id.
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lates the accumulation and transport of organic matter
through the vegetated wetland system, and is part of the nor-
mal input of organic matter into the Chesapeake Bay. 28 The
Ware Creek system and associated upland support aquatic
breeding and nursery habitat for fish species, 2 migratory
birds, 80  resident bird populations,1 81  mammals,32  and
amphibians and reptiles.'3 3 Based on a finding of unaccept-
able effects on wildlife,134 the acting Assistant Administrator
for Water restricted "the designation of the [Ware Creek ba-
sin] as a discharge site[] for dredged of fill material expressly
for the purpose of establishing a local water supply for James
City County and as such prohibit[ed] placement of fill for that
purpose."13 5
The following year, the EPA issued the Final Determina-
tion Big River. 3 6 This determination concerned a proposed
project to create a municipal water supply impoundment on
Big River in Kent County, Rhode Island."' The proposed pro-
ject involved the construction of a dam to create a 3,400 acre
128. Id. at 15.
129. Id. at 63. These species include White perch and other species important to
commercial and recreational fisheries. Id.
130. Id. The migratory bird species include the Great Blue heron, which utilizes
a rookery within the proposed project site, and the Black duck, which has exper-
ienced serious national population declines due to habitat loss. Id.
131. Id. The Wood duck is just one example of the resident birds. Id.
132. Id. Mammals include species such as the Whitetail deer, the muskrat, and
the River otter. Id.
133. Id. The amphibians and reptiles include species of salamanders, snakes,
frogs, and turtles. Id. at 22.
134. Id. at 4. The EPA found that the impoundment: "[1] would result in the
destruction and loss of a diverse wetland habitat that provides substantial and criti-
cal ecological support to wildlife in the Ware Creek wetlands systems and associated
areas . . . [and] [2] would have an adverse impact on down stream aquatic systems
including Chesapeake Bay." Id. The EPA also found that: "[T]here are practicable,
less environmentally damaging alternatives that are available to James City County
for the purpose of providing a water supply to meet the projected need for the
County." Id.
135. Id. at 5.
136. Final Determination Big River, supra note 61.
137. Id. at 1. In 1979, the State of Rhode Island requested that the Corps evalu-
ate the potential flood control and recreation benefits of the project. It was not until a
subsequent permit application in 1986, that the State of Rhode Island stated that the
purpose of the project was to provide a municipal water supply. Id. at 2.
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impoundment"'8 and the construction of an impermeable
slurry wall, which would reach down to bedrock to prevent the
natural flow of groundwater out of the Big River area. 39 Data
indicated that 575 acres of wetlands exist within the proposed
impoundment boundaries. 140 The Assistant Administrator for
Water concluded that the proposed impoundment would: 1)
impact on an area of "exceptional and diverse natural wetland
and free flowing aquatic systems;" 1 1 2) cause direct loss of
habitat for "an abundant and complex assemblage of wildlife
species;' ' 14  3) alter groundwater flow; 4 3 4) adversely impact
downstream aquatic habitats;14' and 5) significantly alter the
present recreational use of the area.'4" Based on the unaccept-
able adverse effects to wildlife areas and the existence of
available practicable alternatives, the Assistant Administrator
for Water prohibited the designation of "Big River, Mishnock
River and their tributaries and adjacent wetlands as discharge
sites for dredged or fill material for the purpose of creating
the Big River reservoir.''114
III. The Bersani Case
A. History of the Attempt to Develop the Sweedens Swamp
Site
Sweedens Swamp, a 49.5-acre forested wetland, was a
part of the eighty-two-acre site"17 located in South Attleboro,
138. Id. at 1. The dam would be approximately 2,300 feet long and seventy feet
high. Id. The impoundment would have an average depth of twenty-five feet. Id.
139. Id. The slurry wall would be in the northeastern portion of the proposed
reservoir. Id.
140. Id. at 6. Measurement data was obtained from aerial photography and field
checking performed by the University of Rhode Island. Id.
141. Id. at 8.
142. Id.
143. Id. The slurry wall would interrupt groundwater flow into the Mishnock
Lake and the forested wetlands in Mishnock Swamp. Id. at 9.
144. Id. at 9.
145. Id. Because the Big River project is primary for potable water, Rhode Is-
land state policies would restrict access. Id.
146. Id. at 10-11.
147. Final Determination Sweedens Swamp, supra note 10, at 7. The site also
included emergent wetland, shrub swamp, streams, and standing water. Id.
[Vol. 7
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Massachusetts, where developers proposed to construct a
shopping mall.'" It is identified as a "high-quality red maple
swamp" by the Massachusetts Division of Fisheries and Wild-
life.14 9 In spite of extensive adjacent development, illegal
dumping, and motorbike intrusion in some areas of the site, 150
Sweedens Swamp remains a functional island ecosystem
which provides wildlife habitat, food chain production, natu-
ral flood storage, groundwater discharge, and waterborne pol-
lutant removal. 15 1
The first attempt to build a shopping mall on the
Sweedens Swamp site was undertaken by Pyramid's predeces-
sor, the Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation (DeBartolo).5 2
When DeBartolo purchased the site, some time before April
1982, an alternative site was available in North Attleboro. 5 3
Pursuant to state requirements, 54 DeBartolo applied to the
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality Engi-
neering (DEQE) for a building permit. The DEQE denied the
permit in April 1982.155 In December 1983, while the denial
was on appeal to the DEQE, Pyramid took over the project.
Pyramid won the appeal started by DeBartolo and the DEQE
granted a permit in March 1985 under the old regulations. "
A subsequent court challenge by a citizens group resulted in
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upholding the
148. Id. at 2.
149. Id. at 7.
150. Id. at 7-8.
151. Id. at 8.
152. Bersani v. EPA, 850 F.2d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1089
(1989).
153. Id. Pyramid subsequently concluded that the North Attleboro site was not a
practicable alternative. Pyramid based its conclusion on the following factors: 1) lack
of sufficient traffic volume; 2) lack of sufficient local road access; 3) strong doubts
from potential tenants; and 4) strong community resistance to previous develop-
ments. Bersani v. EPA, 674 F. Supp. 405, 410 (N.D.N.Y. 1987).
154. Bersani, 850 F.2d at 40. See also MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40 (West
1974 & Supp. 1989). In addition to federal approval, Massachusetts requires state
approval for projects that fill wetlands. Bersani, 850 F.2d at 40.
155. Bersani, 850 F.2d at 40.
156. Id. at 41. Massachusetts adopted new standards for permit approval in
April 1986. The new standards included wildlife habitat as a protected wetland value
and required an absence of a practicable alternative to a proposed wetland site. Id.
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DEQE permit because Pyramid was held to stand in its pred-
ecessor's shoes.157
In July 1984, Pyramid applied to the New England re-
gional division of the Corps for a federal permit under CWA
section 404.158 Pyramid's development plan proposed to fill
thirty-two acres of the 49.5-acre red-maple swamp, to alter
thirteen acres of existing wetland, and to excavate nine acres
of upland to create artificial wetlands on-site. 59 Pyramid
modified its plan in April 1985 to include off-site mitigation
which would have included the creation of thirty-six acres of
wetlands. 60
A review of Pyramid's application was conducted by the
EPA, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and the Corps.1"'
In November 1984, the EPA and the FWS recommended that
the Corps deny Pyramid's application because of inconsisten-
cies with CWA section 404(b)(1) guidelines. 6 2 Pyramid had
failed to overcome the presumption of available practicable
alternatives and had failed to adequately mitigate the adverse
impact on wildlife. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (1990).1's After hir-
ing a consultant to investigate the feasibility of the Sweedens
Swamp and the North Attleboro sites, the Corps advised Pyr-
amid that it intended to deny the permit.' Normally, the re-
157. Citizens for Responsible Envtl. Mgt. v. Attleboro Mall, Inc., 400 Mass. 658,
511 N.E.2d 562 (1987). The Massachusetts District Court had reversed the DEQE on
the ground that the new regulation should have been applied, but the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court upheld the DEQE's permit approval. Id.
158. Final Determination Sweedens Swamp, supra note 10, at Appendix A. Pub-
lic notice describing the project was issued in August 1984. Id.
159. Id. at 5.
160. Id.
161. Bersani v. EPA, 850 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1089
(1989).
162. Id. at 41-42. CWA section 404(b)(1) [§ 1344(b)(1)] guidelines require that
developers of wetlands whose projects do not "require access or proximity to or siting
within special aquatic sites to fulfill their basic purpose" must overcome the rebutta-
ble presumption of practicable alternatives, 45 Fed. Reg. 85,336, 85,339 (1980) (codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (1990)), and must adequately mitigate the adverse impact
on wildlife. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (1990).
163. Bersani, 850 F.2d. at 42-43. Pyramid failed to meet both criteria. Id.
164. Id. at 42. The consultant determined that either site was a feasible location
for a mall. However, the area could support only one mall. Id.
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gional division office would have made the final decision.16
However, General John F. Wall, the Director of Civil Works
at Corps headquarters, reviewed and reversed the regional de-
cision."6' The EPA vetoed the issuance of the section 404 per-
mit because it found:
(1) that the filling of the Swamp would adversely affect
wildlife; (2) that the North Attleboro site could have been
available to Pyramid at the time Pyramid investigated
the area to search for a site; (3) that considering Pyra-
mid's failure or unwillingness to provide further materials
about its investigation of alternative sites, it was uncon-
tested that at best, Pyramid never checked the availabil-
ity of the North Attleboro site as an alternative; (4) that
the North Attleboro site was feasible and would have less
adverse impact on the wetlands environment; and (5) that
the mitigation proposal did not make the project prefera-
ble to other alternatives because of scientific uncertainties
of success. 6 7
B. The District Court Opinion
Both the EPA and Pyramid made cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment before the United States District Court for
the Northern District of New York. 168 Pyramid sought an or-
der vacating the EPA's decision. 69 Pyramid contended that
the EPA's decision was incorrect as a matter of law because
"(1) the EPA impermissibly relied on the 'avoidability' of en-
vironmental impacts in determining their 'unacceptability'
under section 404(c) and (2) the EPA impermissibly reconsid-
ered the section 404(b) availability question and backdated
165. Id.
166. Bersani, 850 F.2d at 42. Wall stated: "In a proper case, mitigation measures
can be said to reduce adverse impacts of a proposed activity to the point where there
is no 'easily identifiable difference in impact' between the proposed activity (includ-
ing mitigation) versus the alternatives to that activity." Id.
167. Id. at 42-43.
168. Bersani v. EPA, 674 F. Supp. 405, 407 (N.D.N.Y. 1987), affd, 850 F.2d 36
(2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1089 (1989).
169. Id.
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the inquiry."1 0 Pyramid also alleged that the EPA amended
its regulations without following the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA)."'7 The EPA argued that: 1) it had clear stat-
utory authority under CWA section 404(c) to prohibit the fill-
ing of wetlands which unacceptably and adversely impact
wildlife; 2) it had authority to consider CWA section 404(b)(1)
guidelines in determining the unacceptability of environmen-
tal impacts; and 3) its timing of the practicable alternatives
test was proper and consistent with the goals of the CWA and
its regulations.1 7 2
Judge McAvoy granted the EPA's motion for summary
judgment.13 He determined that, in order to overturn the
EPA's decision, the decision must have been "arbitrary and
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accor-
dance with the law. 1 74 The court held that EPA's feasibility
determination and its finding of site availability at market en-
try were not arbitrary.175 On the issue of whether CWA sec-
tion 404(b)(1) guidelines7 could be used in CWA section
404(c) review, 17 7 the court held the "EPA's interpretation that
the avoidability of a loss may be considered in conjunction
with its magnitude in determining whether it is 'unacceptable'
within the meaning of section 404(c) and 'significant' within
the meaning of the implementation regulation is reasona-
ble. 1 7 8 In reviewing the legislative history of the CWA, the
court found that "none of the history cited demonstrate[d]
that the Administrator [could] not consider the practicable al-
ternatives test originally employed by the Corps in determin-
ing the environmental impact of a proposed discharge on the
five identified resources.' 79 Additionally, the court held that
170. Id. at 411-12.
171. Id. at 412 n.18. The court rejected this contention. Id.
172. Id. at 412.
173. Id. at 420-21.
174. Id. at 412.
175. Id. at 417, 419.
176. See supra note 13.
177. See supra note 15.
178. Bersani, 674 F. Supp. at 415.
179. Id. at 417. CWA section 404(c) [§ 1344(c)] identifies the following five re-
sources: municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas, wildlife, or recrea-
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the "Final Determination must be upheld as reasonable be-
cause it was based upon a rational, independent finding that a
significant loss in wildlife resources would result from the con-
struction of a mall at Sweeden's Swamp."180
C. The Court of Appeals Affirms
1. The Majority Opinion
On appeal, Pyramid's principal argument challenged the
EPA's market entry approach.18 The two main points of Pyr-
amid's challenge were: 1) the market entry approach was in-
consistent with regulatory language and past practices of the
Corps and the EPA;182 and 2) the court should not defer to
the EPA's regulatory interpretation because this issue did not
require environmental expertise, and because section 404 per-
mitting is a jointly administered program.18s Pyramid also
made other subordinate claims in support of its challenge.184
These claims were: 1) the market entry approach was not spe-
cific enough to constitute public notice as to when one must
consider alternative sites, therefore, it violated the APA; 2)
the EPA was fundamentally unfair in applying its new ap-
proach in this case; and 3) the district court exceeded its au-
thority because it supplied a rationale not offered by the
EPA.185
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
tional areas. CWA § 404(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c).
180. Bersani, 674 F. Supp. at 419.
181. Bersani v. EPA, 850 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1089
(1989).
182. Id. at 38, 43. Pyramid argued that CWA section 404(b)(1) [§ 1344(b)(1)]
guidelines were framed in the present tense, while the market entry approach focused
on the past. Pyramid then cited to Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) to support its contention that present tense language
should refer only to the present and future. Bersani, 850 F.2d at 43. Pyramid also
argued that neither the Corps nor the EPA had ever applied a market entry ap-
proach. Id. at 44.
183. Bersani, 850 F.2d at 38, 45-46. Pyramid contends that when two jointly re-
sponsible administering agencies "reach divergent conclusions," the court must use
its own judgment in construing a regulation. Id. at 46.
184. Id. at 38, 46.
185. Id. at 46.
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cuit affirmed the lower court's opinion. 8 6 The court held "(1)
that the market entry theory is consistent with both the regu-
latory language and past practice; (2) the EPA's interpreta-
tion, while not necessarily entitled to deference, is reasonable
and its application of its rule is supported by the record; and
(3) that Pyramid's other arguments lacked merit.' 1 87 Based
upon a review of the regulations as a whole and in the context
of the controlling statute, the court concluded that:
[W]hen the agencies drafted the language in question
they simply were not thinking of the specific issues raised
by the instant case, in which an applicant had available
alternatives at the time it was selecting its site but these
alternatives had evaporated by the time it applied for a
permit.188
The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the
"regulations are essentially silent on the issue of timing
... "189 The court then considered the objectives of the
CWA and the intent underlying the promulgation of the regu-
lations and concluded that "a common sense reading of the
statute can lead only to the use of the market entry approach
used by the EPA."'190 Upon examination of prior EPA and
court decisions, the court was satisfied that the issue was one
of first impression. 191 The court viewed the EPA's action in
this case as "an application of the regulatory language to the
specific needs of this case which arose here for the first
time."' '92 The court agreed with the district court's conclusion
that the EPA's findings were not arbitrary and capricious. 9 '
186. Id. at 38.
187. Id. at 47.
188. Id. at 43.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 44. The majority rejected an argument based on Gwaltney that the
most natural reading of the regulations would result in a time-of-application rule. Id.
at 43.
191. Id. at 45.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 38.
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Regarding Pyramid's other claims, 94 the court held that the
"EPA did not create and announce a 'new' standard and ap-
ply it retroactively to Pyramid. Rather the EPA interpreted
the law to apply it to the facts of this case" 195 and the "EPA
could reasonably have determined that Pyramid should be
held to 'stand in the shoes' of DeBartolo, especially since it
was able to obtain state approval of the project under the less-
stringent . . standards that had originally applied to
DeBartolo."19' Finally, the court of appeals held that the dis-
trict court did not supply a rationale for the EPA but used
one of several supplied by the EPA.1 97
2. The Dissent
Judge Pratt, writing a strong dissent, stated:
Finding that a "common-sense reading" of 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344(c) "can lead only to the use of the market entry
approach", the majority today holds that in determining
whether an "alternative is available", EPA is to look, not
at the present circumstances and most current data, but
rather at circumstances and data which existed, perhaps
years earlier, when the developer "entered the market".
This market entry theory approaches a sensitive environ-
mental problem through a time warp, it ignores the stat-
ute's basic purpose, and it creates unfair and anomalous
results.198
In examining the legislative history, Judge Pratt determined
that the statute was directed at the land itself, and not at
whether the potential developer was dealing with clean
194. Id. at 46. Pyramid claimed: (1) the EPA's market entry theory violated ad-
ministrative law principles because of the lack of public notice as to when alternative
sites must be considered; (2) the EPA unfairly applied market entry to this case; and
(3) the district court exceeded its authority by supplying a rationale not offered by
the EPA. Id.
195. Id. at 46-47.
196. Id. at 47.
197. Id. at 47.
198. Id. at 47-48 (Pratt, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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hands.199 He interpreted CWA section 404 as creating a test
balancing "biological integrity" against commerce or other ec-
onomic factors. 00 Judge Pratt further stated that "[C]ongress
designed the section to preserve the environment consistent
with reasonable accommodation to the economic and social
needs of the public; it was not concerned with the identities or
past activities of particular developers. 2 0 1 The EPA's market
entry theory ignored this balancing which is central to section
404.202 The EPA also incorrectly focused on the "decisionmak-
ing techniques and tactics of a particular developer" rather
than on the actual alternatives to wetland development.2 03
The market entry theory was further flawed because it is a
vague standard 204 which actually achieved a punitive result
against Pyramid by blindly looking only at alternatives availa-
ble at the time of market entry.03 Judge Pratt supported a
time of decision theory because: 1) the EPA should function
in much the same way as a court of equity and consider the
circumstances which exist at the time it makes its decision;
and 2) the present tense language "is available" commands
the EPA to apply the regulation to the present, not the
past.2 0 6
IV. Analysis of the Decision
As the majority correctly affirmed, the EPA's veto was
not inconsistent with the EPA's or the Corps' practices.0 7
The EPA was correct to classify Pyramid's mall development
as non-water dependent. This classification carried with it the
rebuttable presumption of alternative availability. As in
199. Id. at 48.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 49. Agencies must articulate standards with sufficient clarity so that
the affected community may know what those standards are. Id. See also Motor Ve-
hicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48 (1983).
205. Bersani, 850 F.2d at 49 (Pratt, J., dissenting).
206. Id. See also Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc.
484 U.S. 49, 57 (1987).
207. Bersani, 850 F.2d at 44-47.
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Hough v. Marsh,08 the burden was on Pyramid to overcome
the presumption and Pyramid failed to do so. Bersani may
have been decided differently if Pyramid had been able to
produce a record of extensive search for alternatives as was
produced in National Audubon Society.209 The documenta-
tion of a thorough and valid search would have supported the
argument that Pyramid made regarding the North Attleboro
site. Furthermore, if the EPA were to function as a court of
equity,210 it could not ignore the fact that Pyramid benefited
from standing in DeBartolo's shoes in the Massachusetts
courts. For the EPA to do so would be anomalous and
unfair.2"
The EPA was correct in rejecting General Wall's determi-
nation that Pyramid's off-site mitigation would make Pyra-
mid's Sweedens Swamp proposal the alternative with the least
adverse effect on the aquatic environment.212 The Corps is to
review applications for permits "in accordance with" section
404(b)(1) guidelines.2" These guidelines clearly state that
"where proposed development and restoration techniques
have not yet advanced to the pilot demonstration stage, [they
must be] initiated . . . on a small scale to allow corrective ac-
tions if unanticipated adverse impacts occur.121 4 The pro-
posed creation of thirty-six completely new acres of wetlands
does not follow the guidelines.2 15
208. 557 F. Supp. 74 (D. Mass. 1982). See supra text accompanying notes 53-60.
209. 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,724 (D.N.J. 1983). See supra text ac-
companying notes 37-44.
210. See supra text accompanying note 206.
211. See supra text accompanying note 196.
212. Final Determination Sweedens Swamp, supra note 10, at 5.
213. 33 C.F.R. § 323.6(a) (1990) states that the Corps is to review applications
for permits "in accordance with guidelines promulgated by the Administrator, EPA,
under authority of § 404(b)(1) of the CWA" and section 323.6(b) prohibits the Corps
from issuing a permit when the EPA exercises its section 404(c) [§ 1344(c)] veto.
214. 40 C.F.R. § 230.75(d) (1990).
215. Final Determination Sweedens Swamp, supra note 10, at 27. The science of
creating wetlands is much less advanced than that of wetland restoration and
enhancement.
A created wetland is vulnerable to a number of natural forces .... Con-
sequently, it takes a considerable period of time to be sure that a wetland has
become successfully established and even then there is some uncertainty as
1990]
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Additionally, the present tense language in the section
404(b)(1) guidelines 216 does not command the EPA to limit its
veto review to the present. The market entry approach is not
contrary to the prospective reading requirement of
Gwaltney.2 17 The Court in Gwaltney distinguished the citi-
zens suit provision of CWA section 505218 from the enforce-
ment provision of CWA section 309.219 Even though both sec-
tions contain present tense language, the Court applied a
prospective reading only to section 505. In making this dis-
tinction, the Court noted that Congress had characterized sec-
tion 505 as an injunctive measure and that the Court had pre-
viously held that section 309(d) constituted a separate grant
of enforcement authority. 2 0 The EPA guidelines 221 interpret
section 404 of the CWA. Section 404 of the CWA does not
provide for injunctive relief; it is a grant of permitting author-
ity.2 22 Therefore, it is not logical to apply a prospective read-
ing to section 404 of the CWA.
In his dissent, Judge Pratt interpreted the majority's
holding to limit the EPA's determination of available practi-
cable alternatives to one fixed time in the past.223 This was
to how well it will function .... These uncertainties, and the consequent
need for long-term monitoring, increase with the size of the project.
Id.
216. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (1990). This section states in relevant part:
(a) . . . no discharge of dredged or fill material shall be permitted if there is
a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge which would have less
adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem, so long as the alternative does not
have other significant adverse environmental consequences . . . .(a)(2) An
alternative is practicable if it is available and capable of being done after
taking into consideration cost, existing technology, and logistics in light of
the overall project purposes ....
Id. (emphasis added).
217. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49,
57 (1987).
218. CWA § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
219. CWA § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319.
220. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 58 (citing to Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 425
(1987)).
221. 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.1-233.60 (1990).
222. CWA § 404(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c).
223. Bersani v. EPA, 850 F.2d 36, 48 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1089
(1989).
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too narrow a reading of the majority's opinion. In its analysis
of the practicable alternatives test, the majority stated that
the purpose of this test was "to create an incentive for devel-
opers to avoid choosing wetlands when they could choose an
alternative upland. ' 2 4 The majority correctly pointed out
that applying the practicable alternatives test at the time of
the permit application would create little incentive for devel-
opers to find alternatives, "especially if [the developers] were
confident that alternatives soon would disappear. ' 225 This
spectrum of review was clearly contemplated by the majority.
The majority stated that "in a case in which alternatives were
not available at the time the developer [entered the market],
but became available by the time of [permit] application, the
developer's application would be denied . ,, ." In its Final
Determination on Sweedens Swamp, the EPA reviewed the
entire continuum from market entry up until its decision was
made.227 This full spectrum section 404 review is exactly what
is needed to prevent the systematic destruction of the nation's
wetlands.2 2
V. Conclusion
Over the past 200 years, the United States has lost ap-
proximately fifty percent of its original wetlands primarily
through conversion to other uses such as agriculture and ur-
banization.229 The most recent federal estimate puts the an-
nual wetland conversion rate at about 300,000 acres per
year.230 By implementing section 404 of the CWA, Congress
sought to prevent the ecological damage caused by the unreg-
224. Id. at 44.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See supra note 10.
228. See supra text accompanying note 26. This full spectrum review will also
help attain the goal of no net loss of wetlands. See generally National Wetlands
Panel Seeks New Policy To Protect, Restore, Improve U.S. Wetlands, 19 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1461 (Nov. 18, 1988).
229. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PuB. No. OTA-0-206,
WETLANDS: THEIR USE AND REGULATION (1984).
230. Id. at 11.
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ulated destruction of the nation's wetlands.231 Clearly, Con-
gress gave the EPA its section 404(c) veto power to accom-
plish that end. Limiting the EPA's review of a section 404
permit would limit the scope of the EPA's veto power and
thereby defeat congressional intent. The court of appeals' af-
firmance is correct because it upholds the EPA's right to ap-
ply the practicable alternatives test and to assert the veto
across the entire spectrum of the developer's activities, rather
than limit the EPA to one static moment in time. By uphold-
ing the section 404(c) veto, the court prevented the EPA from
being blind sided by a developer's decision making tactics and
helped insure maximum wetlands protection.
Rosalie K. Rusinko
231. See supra note 26.
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